Abstract. The publication and interchange of RDF datasets online has experienced significant growth in recent years, promoted by different but complementary efforts, such as Linked Open Data, the Web of Things and RDF stream processing systems. However, the current Linked Data infrastructure does not cater for the storage and exchange of sensitive or private data. On the one hand, data publishers need means to limit access to confidential data (e.g. health, financial, personal, or other sensitive data). On the other hand, the infrastructure needs to compress RDF graphs in a manner that minimises the amount of data that is both stored and transferred over the wire. In this paper, we demonstrate how HDT -a compressed serialization format for RDF -can be extended to cater for supporting encryption. We propose a number of different graph partitioning strategies and discuss the benefits and tradeoffs of each approach.
Introduction
In recent years, we have seen an increase in the amount of structured data published online using the Resource Description Framework (RDF), in a manner that not only lends itself to data integration but also 5 supports data exchange. Although Linked Data publishers focus on exposing and linking open data, there are scenarios where individuals and organisations need to store and share sensitive or private data. Additionally, there are number of regulations concerning the fi-nancial, medical, personal, or otherwise sensitive data that require companies to employ strong data protection mechanisms, such as encryption and anonymisation. In order to ensure confidentially it is necessary to encrypt the data not only when it is in transit but also 15 when it is at rest. In such scenarios, where multiple users have different access rights to different parts of * Corresponding author. E-mail: javier.fernandez@wu.ac.at. the data, users should only be able to access the data they are allowed to access.
When it comes to Linked Data protection, to date 20 research has focused on the encryption of partial RDF graphs using eXtensible Markup Language (XML) encryption techniques [19] [20] [21] or proposing strategies for querying encrypted RDF data [30] . One of the primary challenges of existing encryption strategies is that they 25 result in a verbose serialization that prevents their use at scale. RDF compression is an emerging research area that focuses on reducing the space requirements of traditional RDF serializations. One approach to efficient data exchange is a (binary) RDF serialization 30 format known as HDT (Header Dictionary Triples) [16] that can be used to compress large datasets in a manner than can be queried without prior decompression [37] . Together encryption and compression mechanisms could be used to cater for the compact storage 35 and efficient exchange of confidential data.
In this paper, we combine "compression+encryp-tion" functionality for RDF datasets, thus allowing service providers to store and share confidential data while reducing storage and bandwidth usage. In par-40 ticular, we propose HDT crypt , an extension of HDT to represent encrypted datasets for multiple users with different access rights (i.e. users can only access particular subgraphs of the RDF dataset). To do so, we assume a service provider defines the different "ac- 45 cess restricted" subgraphs of a dataset, and we investigate different partitioning strategies to better capture and represent the redundancy (i.e. repeated triples and terms) between them in HDT.
The contributions of our paper can be summarised 50 as follows, we: (i) demonstrate how HDT compression can be extended to cater for encrypted RDF data;
(ii) examine a number of alternative partitioning strategies that can be used to reduce the number of duplicates in encrypted HDT (referred to as HDT crypt ); and
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(iii) compare different partitioning strategies in terms of bandwidth and performance. Experiments show that each of our partitioning strategies is able to achieve space savings over the compression baseline (up to 31%), and are comparable in terms of query perfor-60 mance. We present different space/performance tradeoffs and discuss how partitioning strategies are influenced both by the number of access restricted subgraphs and the distribution of triples across subgraphs. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Sec-65 tion 2 we discuss related work on RDF encryption and compression. Section 3 provides the necessary background information on HDT and Section 4 describes how compression can be combined with encryption. Section 5 details the different partitioning strategies 70 that can be used in conjunction with graph based encryption. In Section 6 we evaluate using both realworld and synthetic RDF datasets and discusses the trade-off between space and performance. Finally, we conclude and highlight future work in Section 7. 75 
Related Work
When it comes to encryption and RDF, the focus to date has been on proposing strategies for the partial encryption of RDF graphs [19] [20] [21] or the querying of encrypted data [30] . Giereth [20, 21] demonstrate how 80 XML based encryption techniques can be used to encrypt confidential data in an RDF-graph, while all nonconfidential data is left as plaintext. Gerbracht [19] built on this work by examining how encryption techniques can be used to encrypt RDF elements and RDF 85 subgraphs, in a manner that reduces the storage overhead. Kasten et al. [30] in turn discuss how data can be encrypted and queried according to SPARQL triple patterns. However this proposal suffers from scalability problems given that each triple is encrypted 90 multiple times depending on whether or not access to the subject, predicate and/or object is restricted. A recent work by Fernández et al. [13] uses Predicatebased Encryption [31] to enable controlled access to encrypted RDF data, i.e., data providers can generate 95 query keys based on (triple-)patterns, whereby one decryption key can decrypt all triples that match its associated triple pattern. In the database and cloud community, Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) [10] has been extensively applied to store and search data 100 in a secure manner. SSE techniques focus on the encryption of outsourced data such that an external user can encrypt their query and subsequently evaluate it against the encrypted data. The more recent Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [18] technique allows 105 any general circuit/computation over encrypted data, however it is prohibitively slow for most operations [7, 42] . None of these works examine the interplay between encryption and compression, which is the focus of our present paper. In particular, we investigate dif-110 ferent HDT compression strategies for RDF datasets, which are organised into different RDF graphs that need to be encrypted with different keys. However, our approach could be adapted to work with partially encrypted graphs.
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Following the categorization in [39] , an RDF compressor can be classified as either syntactic or semantic. Syntactic compressors try to detect redundancy at the serialisation level, whereas semantic compressors try to eliminate logical redundancies. HDT was de-120 signed as a binary serialisation format for RDF graphs, but its optimised encodings means that HDT also excels as a syntactic RDF compressor [16, 37] . In HDT RDF data is encoded into two main data-driven components: a Dictionary that maps all distinct terms in the 125 dataset to unique identifiers (IDs) (reducing symbolic redundancy), and a triple component that encodes the inner RDF structure as a compact graph of IDs (reducing structural redundancy). This kind of redundancy is also addressed in k 2 -triples [1] . However, in 130 the case of k 2 -triples the authors perform a predicatebased partition of the dataset into disjoint subsets of (subject, object) pairs. These subsets are highly compressed as (sparse) binary matrices that also allow for efficient data retrieval. RDF compression can also ben-135 efit from semantic redundancy. Theoretic foundations of exploiting logical redundancies with respect to rules and grammars have been investigated by [41] and [35] , respectively. In particular, the recent compressor gRePair [35] reports the best compression ratios over the structure of RDF graphs (i.e. the graph after ID replacement), to the best of our knowledge.
Likewise, Joshi et al. [28] use rules to discard triples that can be inferred from others, and they only encode these "primitive triples". In doing so they reduce 145 the number of triples and consequently save space. The authors also propose a combination of semantic and syntactic compression, by integrating their approach with syntactic HDT compression techniques. Interestingly the results were similar to those obtained 150 by simply using HDT. Recently, Wu et al. [39] have proposed SSP, a hybrid syntactic and semantic compressor. Their evaluation demonstrates that SSP+bzip2 is slightly better than HDT+bzip2. Other approaches, like HDT-FoQ [37] or WaterFowl [9] also enable com-155 pressed data to be retrieved without the need for decompression. Both techniques, based on HDT serialization, report competitive performance at the price of using more space than other compressors such as k 2 -triples or gRePair.We also use HDT compression,
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however specifically we examine the syntactic redundancy between RDF graphs that need to be encrypted separately, and propose and evaluate four alternative HDT compression strategies. The exploitation of semantic redundancies within HDT is out of scope and 165 left for future work (for more details on semantic compression and HDT we refer the reader to the work by Hernández-Illera et al. [26] ).
Preliminaries
Before we present our approach, we need to intro-170 duce some concepts and terminology from RDF and HDT. Thereafter, in Section 4, we propose a general mechanism to extend HDT with encryption, termed HDT crypt . As usual, an RDF Graph G is a finite set of triples from I ∪ B × I × I ∪ B ∪ L, where I, B, L denote IRIs, blank nodes and RDF literals, respectively [24] . Figure 1 shows an example of an RDF graph representing two individuals ex:Bob and ex:Alice, and the project ex:pastProject of the latter. In this paper, we discuss 180 different ways to compress and encrypt such datasets, using HDT a particular compression format for RDF graphs.
HDT [16] is a binary, compressed serialization format for optimized RDF storage and transmission, which also allows certain lookups and queries over compressed data. It is therefore very suitable for the efficient exchange and querying of large datasets. HDT encodes an RDF graph G into three components: the Header component H holds metadata, including rele-190 vant information necessary for discovery and parsing; the Dictionary component D is a catalogue that encodes all RDF terms in G and maps each of them to a unique identifier; the Triple component T compactly encodes G's graph structure as tuples of three IDs that 195 are used to represent the directed labelled edges in an RDF graph. Figure 2 shows the Dictionary component (a), the underlying graph structure (b) and the final Triple component (c) for the previous RDF graph G (Figure 1 ). 
HDT Dictionary Component D
This component organises the terms in a graph G according to their positions in RDF triples, thus we also write D(G) to denote the dictionary component constructed from graph G: the section SO manages terms 205 occurring both as subject and object, and maps them to the ID-range [1, |SO|] , where |SO| is the number of such terms acting as subject and object. Sections S and O comprise terms that only occur as subjects or objects, respectively. Both sections are mapped 210 from |SO|+1, ranging up to |SO|+|S| and |SO|+|O|, respectively. Finally, section P organises all predicate terms, which are mapped to the range [1, |P|] . It is worth noting that no ambiguity is possible once we know the role (i.e. the position in a triple, being sub-215 ject, predicate or object) played by the corresponding ID. For further details, we refer to [38] . For convenience, we write id(x, D) for the particular ID assigned to an RDF term x, whereas we refer to all IDs and RDF and terms(D), respectively. Note that, for simplicity, we omit the "role" parameter in these functions, which should be provided in case the terms in subjects (or objects) and predicates are not disjoint [38] . Also, it is worth mentioning that in the original HDT proposal, 225 blank nodes are treated exactly as any other term [16] , considering an optional skolemization of blank nodes as a pre-processing step.
HDT Triple Component T
This component encodes the structure of the RDF 230 graph after ID substitution, taking into consideration a particular dictionary D, thus, we write T (G, D) to denote a triple component that was constructed from the triples in G using the IDs in dictionary D. More concretely, RDF triples are encoded as groups of three 235 IDs: (ids idp ido), where ids, idp, and ido are the IDs of the corresponding subject, predicate, and object terms in the dictionary. T organises all triples into a forest of trees, one per different subject: the subject is the root; the middle level comprises the ordered list of 240 predicates reachable from the corresponding subject; and the leaves list the object IDs related to each (subject, predicate) pair. This underlying representation (illustrated in Figure 2b ) is effectively encoded following the BitmapTriples approach [16] . It comprises two 245 sequences: Sp and So, concatenating all predicate IDs in the middle level and all object IDs in the leaves, respectively; and two bitsequences: Bp and Bo, which are aligned with Sp and So respectively, using a 1-bit to mark the end of each list (Figure 2c ). In practice, each 250 ID in Sp and So is encoded with a fixed-length encoding, using log(n) bits, where n is the maximum ID in the sequence [16] . Again, we use ids(T ) to refer to all IDs used in a triple component T .
HDT Header Component H
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The HDT Header includes (i) the machine-readable metadata that is necessary to process an HDT file (format metadata); and (ii) additional human-readable information to describe the dataset (usually in the form of VoID 1 descriptions). The format metadata is mainly 260 focused on characterising the dictionary and triple formats. In general, an HDT file of a graph G consists of a single header H, dictionary D and triples T , to represent the shared components between accessrestricted datasets efficiently, addressed in Section 5.
Representing access-restricted RDF datasets
We consider hereinafter that users wishing to publish access-restricted RDF datasets divide their com-290 plete graph of RDF triples G into (named) graphs, that are accessible to other users, i.e. we assume that access rights are already materialised per user group in the form of a set (cover) of separate, possibly overlapping, RDF graphs, each of which are accessible to different 295 sets of users.
Borrowing terminology from [25] , an access restricted RDF dataset (or just "dataset" in the following) is a set DS = {G, (g 1 , G 1 ), . . . , (g n , G n )} consisting of a (non-named) default graph G and named 300 graphs s.t. g i ∈ I are graph names, where in our setting we require that {G 1 , . . . , G n } is a cover 2 of G. We further call DS a partition of G if G i ∩ G j = ∅ for any i = j; 1 i, j n. Note that from any dataset DS , a canonical partition DS can be trivially constructed
305
(but may be exponential in size) consisting of all nonempty (at most 2 n − 1) subsets G S of triples t ∈ G corresponding to an index set S ∈ 2 1,...,i such that G S = {t | t ∈ i∈S G i ∧ ¬∃S : (S ⊃ S ∧ t ∈ j∈S G j )}. Figure 3 shows an example of such a dataset com-310 posed of three access-restricted subgraphs (or just "subgraphs" in the following) G 1 , G 2 , G 3 for the previous full graph G (Figure 2a) . Intuitively, this corresponds to a scenario with three access rights: users who can access general information about projects in 315 an organisation (graph G 1 ); users who have access to public email accounts and relations between members in the organisation (graph G 2 ); and finally, users who can view personal information of members, such as the salary and personal email accounts (graph G 3 ).
As can be seen, the triple (ex:Alice foaf:mbox "alice@example.org") is repeated in subgraphs G 2 and G 3 , showing a redundancy which can produce significant overheads in realistic scenarios with largescale datasets and highly overlapping graphs. Canoni-
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cal partitioning groups these triples into disjoint sets so 2 In the set-theoretic sense.
that no repetitions are present. In our example in Figure T = {T 1 , . . . , T m } of dictionary and triple components, respectively, such that the union of triple components encodes a cover of G, i.e. the overall graph of all triples in the dataset DS . We do not assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between individ-340 ual triple components in T and graphs in DS ; different options of mapping subgraphs to HDT components will be discussed in Section 5 below. The relation between the dictionaries and the triple components (in other words, which dictionaries are used to 345 codify which triple components) is also flexible and must be specified through metadata properties. In our case, we assume H = {R, M} to contain a relation R ⊆ D × T , which we call the dictionary-triples map with the implicit meaning that dictionary components 350 encode terms used in the corresponding triple components, and M is comprised of additional header metadata (as mentioned above, the header contains a variety of further (meta-)information in standard HDT [15], which we skip for the considerations herein). It is 355 worth noting that we do not prescribe that either D or T do not overlap. However, it is clear that one should find an unambiguous correspondence to decode the terms under ids(T ).
Thus, we define the following admissibility condi-360 tion for R. An HDT collection is called admissible if:
For any admissible HDT collection HDT we define the T -restricted collection HDT T as the collection obtained from removing: (i) all triple components T = T from HDT ; (ii) the corresponding D such that (D , T ) is in R and (D , T ) is not in R; and (iii) the relations 370 (D , T ) from R. Thus allowing an HDT collection to be filtered by erasing all dictionary and triple components that are not required for T . Fig. 3 . An access-restricted RDF dataset such that G comprises three separate access-restricted subgraphs G 1 , G 2 , G 3 ; the graph's canonical partition is comprised of four non-empty subgraphs G 1 , G 2 , G 3 , G 23 , whereas the terms in these graphs can be partitioned into five non-empty subsets corresponding to the dictionaries 
HDT crypt encoding
We now introduce the final encoding of the HDT crypt 375 extension. HDT crypt uses AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [11] to encrypt the D and triple components of an HDT collection and extends the header H with a keymap kmap : D crypt ∪ T crypt → I that maps encrypted components to identifiers (IRIs), which denote 380 AES keys that can be used to decrypt these components.
Thus, HDT crypt = (H, D crypt , T crypt ) where H = {R, kmap, M}, R ⊆ D crypt ×T crypt , and the components in D crypt and T crypt are encrypted with keys identified 385 in kmap.
The operations to encrypt and decrypt the dictionary and triples are described as follows. First, the operation encrypt takes one or more dictionary and triples and encrypts the components with a given 390 key. Formally, we write encrypt(c, key crypt ) = c crypt , where c ∈ D ∪ T to denote the component c crypt ∈ D crypt ∪ T crypt obtained by encrypting c with the key key crypt . While, we add an identifier of the components to the header metadata. In other words, id(c crypt ) → 395 IRI(key crypt ) is added to the kmap, where id denotes the ID of the component in D crypt and T crypt and IRI a unique identifier for the symmetric key.
For the decryption, it is assumed that an authorized user u has partial knowledge about these keys, i.e. they have access to a partial function key u : I u → K that maps a finite set of "user-owned" key IDs I u ⊆ I to the set of AES (symmetric) keys K. The decryption simply takes the given compressed component(s) and performs the decryption with the given symmetric key. Formally, we write decrypt(c crypt , key crypt ) = c, where c crypt ∈ D crypt ∪ T crypt to denote the component c ∈ D ∪ T obtained from decrypting c crypt with the key key crypt = key(kmap(c crypt )). Further we write decrypt(HDT crypt , I u ) to denote the non-encrypted
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HDT collection consisting of all decrypted dictionary and triple components of HDT crypt which can be decrypted with the keys in {key u (i) | i ∈ I u }. In other words, the T -restriction of HDT crypt is defined analogously to the above-said.
Integration operations
Finally, we define two different ways of integrating dictionaries D 1 , . . . , D k ∈ D within an HDT collection: D-union and D-merge. In the former, we replace dictionaries with a new dictionary that includes 420 the union of all terms. In the latter, we establish one of the dictionaries as the dictionary baseline and rename the IDs of the other dictionaries.
D-union
The D-union is only defined for
if the following condition holds on R:
. In other words, we can perform a D-union if all T -components depending on dictionaries in the set D 1 , . . . , D k only depend on these dictionaries. Then, we can define
upon an (arbitrary) total order, e.g., lexicographically ordering the terms
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(as it is done in HDT dictionaries by default). 
D-merge
In the more general case where the condition for Dunions does not hold on D 1 , . . . , D k ⊆ D, we can define another operation, D-merge, written HDT D1 ... Dk .
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We start with the binary case, where only two dictionaries D 1 and D 2 are involved; HDT D1 D2 is obtain as follows:
-replace D 1 and D 2 with a single 
for the triples part generated from G accord-
Finally, we note that for any admissible HDT collection, both D-union and D-merge preserve admissibility.
Efficient Partitioning HDT crypt 475
After having introduced the general idea of HDT crypt and the two different ways of integrating dictionaries within an HDT collection, we now discuss four alternatives strategies that can be used for distributing a dataset DS across dictionary and triple com-480 ponents in an HDT crypt collection. These alternatives, referred to as HDT crypt−A , HDT crypt−B , HDT crypt−C and HDT crypt−D , provide different space/performance tradeoffs that will be evaluated in Section 6. We note that HDT behaves differently than the normal RDF 485 merge regarding blank nodes in different "partitions" as, by default, HDT does not rename the blank nodes to avoid shared labels [27] : the original blank nodes are skolemized to constants (unique per RDF graph) and preserved across partitions, so that we do not need 490 to consider blank node (re-)naming separately. 
HDT crypt−A : A Dictionary and Triples per Named Graph in DS
The baseline approach is straightforward, we construct separate HDT components D i = D(G i ) and
, thereafter each of these components is encrypted with a respective, separate key, identified by a unique
For re-obtaining graph G i 500 a user must only have access to the key corresponding to id i , and can thereby decrypt D i and T i and extract the restricted collection HDT Ti , which corresponds to G i . Obviously, this approach encodes a lot of overlaps in both dictionary and triples parts: that is, for our run-505 ning example from Figure 4 , the IRI for ex:alice is encoded in each individual D component and the overlapping triples in graphs G 2 and G 3 appear in both T 2 and T 3 respectively (cf., Figure 4 ).
HDT crypt−B : Extracting non-overlapping Triples
in DS
In order to avoid the overlaps in the triple components, a more efficient approach could be to split the graphs in the dataset DS according to their canonical partition DS and again construct separate (D,T )-pairs 515 for each subset G S ∈ DS , see Figure 5 . That is, we create D S = D(G S ) and T S = T (G S , D S ) per graph G S ∈ DS , where S ∈ 2 1,...,i denotes the index set corresponding to a (non-empty) subset of DS . R in turn contains pairs (D S , T S ) and kmap entries for keys 520 identified by I S per G S used for the encryption/decryption of the relevant D S and T S . The difference for decryption now is that any user who is allowed access to G i must have all keys corresponding to any I S such that i ∈ S in order to re-obtain the original graph G i .
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First, the user will decrypt all the components for which they have keys, i.e. obtaining a non-encrypted collection HDT consisting of components D = {D 1 , . . . , D k }, T = {T 1 , . . . , T k } consisting of the components corresponding to a partition of G i . Then,
530
for decompressing the original graph G i , we create separate T S -restricted HDTs, which are decompressed separately, with G S being the union of the resulting subgraphs.
HDT crypt−C : Extracting non-overlapping
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Dictionaries in DS
Note that in the previous approach, we have duplicates in the dictionary components. An alternative strategy would be to create a canonical partition of terms instead of triples, and create separate dictionar-540 ies D S ∈ D for each non-empty term-subset, 4 respectively. Figure 6 shows the canonical partition of terms in our running example: as can be seen, the original dictionary is split into five non-empty terms-subsets corresponding to the dictionaries D 123 (terms shared in 545 all three graphs), D 23 (terms shared in graphs G 2 and G 3 that are not in D 123 ) and D 1 , D 2 , D 3 (terms in either G 1 , G 2 or G 3 resp. and are not shared between graphs). This partition can be computed efficiently, thanks to the HDT dictionary D of the full graph G, which we 550 assume to be available 5 . To do so, we keep 6 an auxiliary bitsequence per graph G i (see Figure 6 , top left), each of size terms(D). Then, we iterate through triples in each graph G i and, for each term, we search its ID in D, marking such position with a 1-bit in the bitse-555 quence of G i . Finally, the dictionaries of the subsets can be created by inspecting the combinations of 1-bits in the bitsequences: terms in D xy···z will be those with a 1-bit in the bitsequences of graphs xy · · · z and 0-bits in other graphs. For instance, in Figure 6 , D 123 is consti-560 tuted only by ex:alice, because it is the only term with three 1-bits in the bitsequences of G 1 , G 2 and G 3 . In contrast, ex:Project1 will be part of D 1 as it has a 1-bit only in the bitsequence of G 1 .
The number of triple components in this approach 565 are as in HDT crypt−A , one per graph G i . However, they are constructed slightly differently as, in this case, we have a canonical partition of terms and one user will just receive the dictionaries corresponding to subsets that correspond to terms in the graph G i that they have 570 been granted access to. In other words, the IDs used in each T i should unambiguously correspond to terms, but these terms may be distributed across several dictionaries. 7 Thus, we encode triples with a D-union (see Section 4.3) of the D S such that i ∈ S . That is, for each 575 7 Given the partition definition, it is nonetheless true that a term appears in one and only one term-subset.
, and add the respective pairs (D S , T i ) in R. Figure 7 illustrates this merge of dictionaries for the graph G 1 and the respective construction of T (G 1 , (D 1  ∪D 123 ) ). The decompression process after decryption 580 is the exact opposite. For decompressing the graph G i , the decrypted dictionaries i∈S D S are used to create a D-union D i which can be used to decompress the triples T i in one go. Finally, as a performance improvement at compression time, note that, although 585 the canonical partition of terms has to be built to be shipped in the compressed output, we can actually skip the creation of the D-union dictionaries to encode the IDs in the triples. To do so, we make use of the bitsequences to get the final IDs that are used in the triples:
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One should note that the ID of a term in a D-union of a graph G i is the number of previous 1-bits in the bitsequence of G i (for each SO, S , O, and P section). For instance, in our example in Figure 7 , ex:Project1 is encoded with the ID=2. Instead of creating D 1 , we 595 can see that in the bitsequence of G 1 (see Figure 6 , top right) we have two 1-bits in the predicate section up to the position where ex:Project1 is stored in the original dictionary, hence its ID=2.
HDT crypt−D : Extracting non-overlapping
600
Dictionaries and Triples in DS
In HDT crypt−D , we combine the methods of both HDT crypt−B and HDT crypt−C . That is, we first create a canonical partition of terms as in HDT crypt−C , and a canonical partition of triples DS as in HDT crypt−B .
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Then, we codify the IDs in the subsets of DS with the IDs from the dictionaries. Note, however, that in this case there is -potentially -an n:m between the resulting dictionary and triple components. In other words, triples in T S can include terms that are not 610 only in D S as they may be distributed across several term-subsets. For instance, in our running example, T 1 in HDT crypt−B includes ex:Alice (see Figure  5 ) which is stored in D 123 in HDT crypt−C (see Figure 6) . One alternative could be to create a D-union 615 of each graph G S and codify triples in T S with the corresponding IDs. However, it is trivial to see that this would lead to an exponential number of D-union dictionaries, one per T S component. In addition, we would need to physically recreate all these dictionar-620 ies at compression time, and also at decompression time in order to decompress each single graph G S . Thus, we perform a D-merge approach (see the definition in Section 4.3), which fits perfectly with n:mrelations. This is illustrated in Figure 8 . As can be 625 seen, triples in each G S of the canonical partition are encoded with an appropriate D-merge of termsubsets. A practical example is shown in Figure 9 , representing the encoding of graph For instance, in our example in Figure 9 , the object 660 "bob@example.org" with ID=2 in D 23 (and ID=3 in the D-merge) is not used in T 3 . However, this ID is "blocked": it cannot be used by a different object in T 3 as this ID is taken into account when encoding the present objects ("30K" and "personal@example.org"),
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once we sum the max(ids(D 23 )) as explained above. The same consequence applies to subjects, so that subject IDs are not necessarily correlative in T S . This constitutes a problem for the HDT Bitmap Triples encoding (presented in Section 3.2), given that it repre-670 sents subjects implicitly assuming that they are correlative. Thus, HDT crypt−D has to explicitly state the ID of each subject, which constitutes a space overhead and a drawback of this approach, despite the fact that duplicate terms and triples are avoided. Technically,
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instead of a forest of trees, triples are codified as tuples of three IDs, using an existing HDT triples representation called Plain Triples [15].
Evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of HDT crypt 680 by comparing each of the aforementioned partitioning strategies with respect to the performance of the algorithms and the size of the compressed encrypted dataset. We first describe our experimental setup in detail. Then, we present our evaluation results in terms 685 of three distinct yet related tasks: (i) performance of compression and encryption algorithms and size of resulting datasets; (ii) performance of decryption and decompression algorithms; and (iii) performance of Finally, we provide a summary and discussion of the results in Section 6.5. Additional experiments can be found in Appendix A. 
Experimental Setup
The proof-of-concept HDT crypt prototype 10 uses the existing HDT-C++ library 11 for compression and de- 9 Matching RDF triples in which each component may be a variable 10 Source code and all experiment data are available at the HDTcrypt homepage: https://aic.ai.wu.ac.at/ComCrypt/HDTcrypt/ 11 https://github.com/rdfhdt/hdt-cpp compression, and standard Java libraries for AES encryption/decryption 12 .
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The evaluation is performed on three different datasets, described in Table 1 .
First, we selected DBpedia, the well-known RDF knowledge base extracted from Wikipedia, which was chosen due to the volume and variety of the data and 705 large number of dictionary terms therein. We used two different versions, DBpedia 3.8 13 and the latest version 2016-10 14 , which is double the size of the previous one. Hereinafter, we will use the term DBpedia to refer to both versions, as the results are comparable.
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Then, we chose a realistic scenario using the configuration used in SAFE [32], a query federation engine with access control. The SAFE dataset includes public statistical data (referred to as external) and anonymised clinical data (internal).
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Additionally, in order to test the scalability of the various partitioning strategies we use the Lehigh University Benchmark (LUBM) [23] data generator to obtain synthetic datasets of incremental sizes from 1,000 universities (LUBM1K, including 0.13 billion triples) 720 to 4,000 universities (LUBM4K, 0.53 billion triples). Table 1 shows the original dataset sizes in plain NTriples (NT). In addition, we provide details of the size of the datasets compressed with gzip, HDT and HDT+gz (gzip compression over the HDT file). This shows that 725 our HDT compression ratios are in line with the original proposal [16] . Finally, the last column of the table shows the time (in minutes) to compute the HDT representation of each dataset. In turn, the HDT creation time for LUBM grows linearly with the num- Table 2 ):
, AssistantProfessor (G 10 ), University (G 11 ) and Lecturer (G 12 ).
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-9 subgraphs, composed of the union of UnderGraduateStudent and GraduateStudent (G 1 ), Courses (G 2 ), Publication (G 3 ), the union of AssistantProfessor, ResearchAssistant, and Teachin-
and Lecturer (G 9 ). -6 subgraphs, composed of UnderGraduateStudent and GraduateStudent (G 1 ), the union of AssistantProfessor, ResearchAssistant, TeachingAs-
and University (G 6 ).
When triples represent relations between resources of different types all incoming/outgoing relations are 760 replicated in both subgraphs.
For DBpedia (in the case of both versions), we generate 6, 9 and 12 subgraphs, each containing randomly selected triples amounting to 10% of the entire corpus (thus ensuring overlaps among subgraphs). Triples that 765 do not appear in any subgraph are subsequently distributed evenly among the subgraphs.
In the case of SAFE, the dataset is already organised in 8 subgraphs, composed of 5 external graphs, includ-ing statistical data from well-known organisation such 770 as Eurostat and FAO, and 3 internal graphs including aggregated clinical data represented as RDF data cubes [32] .
Given that the complexity of the partitioning is directly related to the number of duplicates across sub-graphs, the size of each of the subgraphs and the overall duplicate ratio, as , is presented in column DUP % of Table 2 . Note that the type-based selection of subgraphs in LUBM generates a skewed distribution of subgraph sizes but similar 780 duplicate ratio (of approximately 38%) at increasing sizes (LUBM1K to LUBM4K). Thus, the comparison between techniques focuses on the effect of the 6/9/12 subgraphs and the efficiency at large scale. In contrast, the even distribution of DBpedia is reflected in the sim-785 ilar size of its subgraphs. Given that the number of duplicates increase with the number of subgraphs (12%, 22% and 33% for 6/9/12 respectively), the effect of duplicates is also evaluated. In SAFE, the already given 8 subgraphs contains few repeated triples (less than 790 0.01%). Note that the internal subgraphs corresponds to graphs G 4 , G 5 and G 7 in Table 2 , i.e. the public external information corresponds to the biggest partitions.
In the following we show the performance results of 795 each of the algorithms (compression and encryption, decryption and decompression, integration and querying). Experiments were performed in a -commodity server-(Intel Xeon E5-2650v2 @ 2.6 GHz, 16 cores, RAM 180 GB, Debian 7.9.). All of the reported 800 (elapsed) times are the average of three independent executions in a cold cache scenario (caches are empty at the start of each process). Table 3 shows the compression and encryption times 805 as well as corresponding resulting file sizes 15 of the datasets for different partitioning strategies, whereas Table 4 shows the respective number of resulting dictionary and triple components.
Compression and Encryption
The results show that HDT crypt−C is both the fastest 810 and also produces the most compact representation (only marginally outperformed in space by HDT crypt−D in particular LUBM cases). HDT crypt−C is 37% faster than the baseline approach HDT crypt−A in DBpedia 15 Note that encryption produces negligible size overheads on the compressed files.
(we refer to the average in both DBpedia versions here-815 after), and 40% faster in LUBM. In SAFE, with few duplicates, HDT crypt−C is still 18% faster.
In contrast, HDT crypt−B is the slowest approach with a mean of 68% over the baseline, because it needs to create many dictionaries (e.g. 3904 in DBpedia 2016-820 10 as shown in Table 4 ) with overlapping terms. In turn, HDT crypt−D is highly influenced by the number of dictionary components, due to the additional complexity of creating the resp. triple components from the D-merge. Thus, HDT crypt−D is faster than the baseline 825 in LUBM with 6 or 9 subgraphs, with few components as shown in Table 4 , but it shows a worse performance in LUBM 12 subgraphs, as well as in all DBpedia and SAFE datasets.
Note that, as stated in Section 5, the creation of
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HDT crypt−B , HDT crypt−C and HDT crypt−D assumes that the HDT representation of the full graph G is already computed 16 . Otherwise, the HDT creation time (reported in Table 1 ) should be considered as a once-off overhead. In the worst case (i.e. the conversion is done 835 for the sole purpose of encrypting a single dataset with a particular number of subgraphs), adding this time would make the HDT crypt−C perform similarly to the baseline in LUBM. In DBpedia, with a richer dictionary of terms, HDT crypt−C would be 35-50% slower 840 than the baseline.
Additionally, when compared with the baseline approach HDT crypt−A , HDT crypt−C achieves a mean of 33% space saving in DBpedia and 26% space saving in LUBM. In general, HDT crypt−B , HDT crypt−C and
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HDT crypt−D benefit from having an increasing number of overlapping dictionaries/triples, hence the DBpedia even distribution produces more space savings. For the same reason, an increasing number of subgraphs leads to more duplicates and space savings w.r.t the base-850 line, e.g. HDT crypt−C in LUBM achieves 24%, 26% and 27% savings with 6, 9 and 12 subgraphs respectively. It is worth mentioning that despite the fact that HDT crypt−D isolates the non-overlapping dictionaries and triples, there is an overhead in the representation 855 as we do not use Bitmap Triples but Plain Triples (as stated in Section 5.4). This is more noticeable in DBpedia with long predicate and object lists. It is worth highlighting that, in SAFE, with almost no duplicates, 16 In fact, HDT is becoming popular to store and serve large datasets by publishers and third parties, and a large portion of datasets in the Linked Open Data cloud is already available in HDT thanks to the project LOD Laundromat [3] , crawling and serving the HDT conversion of datasets (http://lodlaundromat.org/wardrobe/). Table 3 Performance of compression and encryption algorithms. Table 4 Number of dictionaries/triples in each approach.
Dictionaries
Triples consider a scenario where a subset of the external and internal datasets are accessed. In particular, we also took half of the datasets, Table 5 shows the time to decrypt and decompress each of the respective subgraphs in the case of DBpedia and LUBM, while Table 6 shows the results for SAFE.
Decryption times are almost negligible compared 900 to the decompression time -similar to encryption vs. compression time. Again, the number of files is the dominating factor, hence HDT crypt−A is the fastest approach regarding decryption. Regarding decompression, (as per compression)
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HDT crypt−C is the fastest approach, achieving a mean of 30% time savings in DBpedia and LUBM w.r.t the baseline HDT crypt−A . In DBpedia, given the even distribution, having 6 subgraphs is always slightly faster than 9 and 12 subgraphs as the latter generates more 910 duplicates. Regarding the number of graphs in LUBM, 6 and 12 subgraphs behave similarly, while the decompression of 9 subgraphs is slightly slower. Nonetheless, we could verify that the difference between 9 and 12 subgraphs is due to the slightly bigger total file size 915 produced by M 9 in comparison to M 12 . In turn, the difference between 9 and 6 subgraphs is a consequence of the larger number of generated dictionary/triples between 9 and 6 subgraphs (as shown in Table 4 ). As per compression, there is a linear increase in performance 920 times with increasing dataset sizes.
Finally, although the results for the SAFE dataset (shown in Table 6 ) follow a similar behaviour, it is worth mentioning that HDT crypt−B and HDT crypt−D have to pay the price of loading additional structures 
Querying Compressed Data
One of the main advantages of HDT compression is that it is possible to perform SPARQL triple pattern queries directly on the compressed data [37] . Whereas this also holds for approach HDT crypt−A , as it already der to search the triples IDs, which is then equivalent to integrating HDT crypt−C into a new HDT to be queried.
The following evaluation first inspects the performance overhead of the integration required by the for-955 mer strategy. Then, we evaluate the query performance of the latter. For exemplary purposes, we present the average results of the DBpedia datasets, while the performance for LUBM and SAFE can be found in Appendix A.
960
Note that, although there are a number of strategies for querying encrypted data directly (see e.g., [4] ), we consider these orthogonal and leave combining them with our partitioning for future work. shown in Figure 10 b, reporting the times of merging M 6 , M 9 and M 12 for DBpedia (the trends are similar for all datasets). As expected, given that the integration process yields to a partial decompression of the dictionary and triple components, the integration per-995 formance follows the same pattern as the decompression. That is, the even distribution of DBpedia results in a faster performance for 6 subgraphs, whereas the excessive duplicates of 12 penalises its performance. 
Query Performance
1000
We evaluate the query performance of all partitioning strategies in our use case scenario. ferent predicates. Figure 11 shows the average execution time of the selected queries for both DBpedia versions (the results for LUBM4K and SAFE are presented in Appendix A). Note that, as shown in the previous section, the integration into a new HDT results
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in a non-negligible time to perform the process. Thus, for HDT crypt−A , HDT crypt−B and HDT crypt−D we follow the strategy where queries are executed locally in each dictionary and triple component. In contrast, query execution in HDT crypt−C would require the D-union of all the dictionaries to be created, which is then equivalent to integrating HDT crypt−C into a new 18 All queries are available at the HDTcrypt repository.
HDT to be queried. As such, the performance time for HDT crypt−C is presented as the sum of the time taken to create one integrated HDT (performed once), as previ-
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ously explained in Section 6.4.1, and to subsequently query the integrated HDT (note again that this latter is equivalent to querying HDT crypt−A ). Regarding the comparison between our strategies for partitioning, results show that HDT crypt−A and
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HDT crypt−B have the best performance for all patterns. This can be attributed to the fact that they benefit from efficient Bitmap Triples indexes, while HDT crypt−D must use Plain Triples (as stated in Section 5.4) that perform sequential scans to resolve queries. Note that
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HDT crypt−D is only competitive in the case of (?p?) queries (i.e. retrieving all subjects and objects related to a given predicate), given that most of the triples are returned and the total time is similar to a full sequential scan. In addition, Bitmap Triples indexes are 1035 less efficient for such query types [37] . As previously stated, HDT crypt−C behaves as HDT crypt−A but there is 
a once-off overhead associated with merging all dictionary and triple components into one HDT (represented in red in Figure 14 ).
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In turn, it is also worth mentioning that HDT crypt−B query performance is closer to the baseline HDT crypt−A in the scenario with 6 subgraphs. This is mainly due to the larger number of dictionaries/triples to be queried in a scenario with a higher number of subgraphs (as 1045 shown in Table 4 ), which penalises the HDT crypt−B and HDT crypt−D methods. In this scenario, HDT crypt−A is the most efficient approach for query execution. The noticeable performance difference against the rest of the partitioning approaches suggests that the once-off 1050 merging that is required for HDT crypt−C can be amortised if the dataset is meant for intensive querying after decryption.
Discussion of the results
Overall, our empirical evaluation showed interesting 1055 results and allows us to draw conclusions on the applicability of each strategy. We summarize a ranking of results for each scenario in Table 7 , and we outline the influence of the increasing number of subgraphs and duplicates in the data in Table 8 , detailed as follows:
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-HDT crypt−C is the most effective technique in terms of compression and decompression times, as well as compression sizes. In particular, it achieves additional 26-33% space saving over the -already compressed-baseline (HDT crypt−A ),
1065
and it is 37-40% faster to compress, and 30% faster to decompress. Note that the impact of these space and time savings are even more noticeable when dealing with big data. As we noticed, if the original HDT of the full graph is 1070 not available beforehand, then the creation of HDT crypt−C can take more time than the baseline (it results in approx. the same time in LUBM and 35-50% slower in DBpedia, with a rich dictionary of terms), but it keeps the aforementioned notice-1075 able space savings. In the extreme case of isolated subgraphs with few duplicates, as in SAFE, HDT crypt−C takes the same space as the baseline and is still 18% faster to encrypt. -In contrast, HDT crypt−C does not allow the user 1080 to directly query the exchanged information. If such a scenario is required, this can be solved with a once-off conversion from HDT crypt−C to HDT crypt−A . This conversion can be done for any strategy, but it is indeed faster for HDT crypt−C . proaches. In contrast, the compression time is penalised given that more components have to be generated. Our experiments also showed that the number of subgraphs does not have a strong influence on the query performance, but the skewed 1125 distribution of sizes and the large number of components (such as in DBpedia) can result in slight differences between scenarios.
Conclusions and Future Work
To date Linked Data publishers have focused on ex-
1130
posing and linking open data, however the Linked Data infrastructure could be extended to cater for the storage and exchange of confidential data. In this paper, we discussed how HDT compression can be extended to cater for RDF datasets which needs to be encrypted.
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Specifically, we proposed a number of different compression strategies that are compatible and demonstrated the need for careful integration when it comes to compressed encrypted RDF data. From our evaluation we can see that our proposal HDT crypt−C out-1140 performs the other partitioning strategies both in terms of compression and decompression time, and it also produces the most compact representation, resulting in 26-31% space savings over the -already compressedbaseline. HDT crypt−B and HDT crypt−D also reduce the 1145 size of the baseline significantly. Whereas, when it comes to querying HDT crypt−A and HDT crypt−B outperform HDT crypt−C , which incurs additional overhead as the dictionaries and triples need to be integrated in order to support querying. Additionally, we note that 1150 compression, decompression and query performance is influenced both by the number of access restricted subgraphs and the distribution of triples across subgraphs, especially in HDT crypt−D . In future work, we plan to extend our existing work to cater for querying over en-1155 crypted compressed data without the need for decryption. Our current work considers basic triple pattern resolution, while the HDT approach can be used as the basic engine to resolve full SPARQL queries. Our plan is to support this possibility on the compressed and en-1160 crypted data in future work.
This appendix comprises the performance results for all datasets. See Section 6 for a description of the corpus and the complete discussion of results.
A.1. Integrating dictionary and triple components into a new HDT Figure 12 shows the time (in seconds) to integrate the dictionary and triples components of half of the partitions 1325 (M 6 , M 9 and M 12 as explained in Section 6) of LUBM into a single HDT per subgraph. We present the time to integrate the dictionary and triple components of M 12 into the corresponding subgraphs (Figure 12 a) , and a comparison in terms of number of subgraphs (Figure 10 b) . Figure 13 shows the integration of the SAFE dataset for the two scenarios, M 
A.2. Querying Compressed Data
1330
Figures 14 and 15 show the performance of the selected Triple Patterns over LUBM4K and SAFE, respectively. Results for smaller datasets of LUBM4K follow the same trends. As in the case of DBpedia, presented in Section 6, results show that HDT crypt−A and HDT crypt−B have the best performance for all patterns, outperforming its results when few triples are returned, such as (spo) and (sp?) queries. Note that, although HDT crypt−B has to query more dictionaries and triple components than HDT crypt−A , the number of total components is very limited in LUBM (the number of components is shown in Table 4 ) and each component is smaller in HDT crypt−B than in HDT crypt−A . For instance, the resolution of a (sp?) pattern using HDT crypt−A for M 12 in LUBM4K (see performance results in Figure 14 a) has to query 6 large triple components (one per subgraph), where duplicated triples can be present. In contrast, for HDT crypt−B we could verify that there are 37 triple components in M 12 , but they are smaller and triples do not overlap. As for SAFE, note that the dataset is particularly small and has few overlapping triples, hence the Finally, Figure 16 presents the results of a particular scenario designed to evaluate the potential influence of the number of graphs in a fair manner. Note that, in the previous use case, the number of results could differ in each subgraph as M 6 , M 9 and M 12 include different subgraphs (e.g. ResearchAssistant is included as G 6 in M 12 but it is present neither in M 9 nor M 6 ). This fact hampers a fair comparison of the query performance, given that the 1345 number of results could differ. This situation is even worse in DBpedia, where each subgraph contains randomly selected triples. Thus, for this particular comparison, we select the University subgraph in LUBM, which is present in M 12 (as G 11 in Table 2 ), M 9 (as G 8 ) and M 6 (as G 6 ). We then generate 30 random triple pattern queries of each type (similarly to the previous scenario) and perform such queries on the aforementioned University subgraph. Figure 16 reports the total performance of all queries for LUBM4K (results are similar for smaller sizes). Note 1350 that HDT crypt−A reports the same time in all cases and they compress the same subgraph. In general, results are in line with the previous observations regarding the influence of subgraphs for decompression. That is, in general, 12 subgraphs is the fastest approach, whereas the larger size of the files and their duplication ratio place also a burden on the query performance of 9 subgraphs. Nonetheless, we can find a minor difference in HDT crypt−D , where the case of 6 subgraphs reports the worst performance. A closer look at the generated dictionary and triple components 1355 for the particular University subgraph allows us to conclude that this particular case produced a skewed distribution of sizes in 6 subgraphs. For example, the largest dictionary component takes 75MB, whereas it is only 27MB and 12MB for 9 and 12 subgraphs respectively. Note that although this skewed distribution is also present in DBpedia, in practice, HDT crypt−D can be slower with 12 subgraphs than with 6 subgraphs, given that the much larger number of dictionary and triple components in 12 subgraphs (due to the duplication ratio) are the predominant factor. 
